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THE RIGORS OF ESTABLISHING INNATENESS and domain
specificity pose challenges to adaptationist models of
music evolution. In articulating a series of constraints,
the authors of the target articles provide strategies for
investigating the potential origins of music. We propose
additional approaches for exploring theories based on
exaptation. We discuss a view of music as a multimodal
system of engaging with affect, enabled by capacities of
symbolism and a theory of mind.
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USTUS AND HUTSLER (2005) and McDermott and
Hauser (2005) provide very sensible advice for
investigating the bioevolutionary origins of music.
Both articles highlight the evidentiary burden that
should be placed on evolutionary theories of music,
particularly those implicating processes of adapta-
tion. The authors outline strategies of identifying
musical properties that are innately determined,
domain-specific, and uniquely human and suggest
that evolutionary theories should be restricted to a
consideration of such properties.
According to Justus and Hutsler, the most compelling
evidence of adaptation for a cognitive domain is the
demonstration of domain-specific innate constraints. If
aspects of music have parallels in domains such as
speech, then “there will always be the possibility that the
mechanism in question originated exclusively through
selection pressures in the other [domain]” (p. 16). This
reasoning explains why there are unresolved debates
about whether music originated from language, lan-
guage originated from music, or music and language
originated from a common ancestor that shared prop-
erties of both systems (Brown, 2000). McDermott and
Hauser argue that theories of musical origins should
focus on characteristics of music that are uniquely
human. If such properties are observed in nonhuman
animals, then they probably evolved as general-purpose
mechanisms that were co-opted for use in music. The
authors also assume that phenotypic similarity among
species often reflects a common genotype.
Such strategies allow researchers to constrain theories
of music as an adaptation to environmental pressures;
they provide less guidance for theories that implicate
exaptation or secondary adaptations. Early evidence for
music is accompanied by evidence for other forms of
human expression that may have been relevant to music
in ways that are not obvious today (Cross 2001;
Henshilwood et al. 2002; Mithen 1996; Morley, 2002).
Moreover, the many uses of music across cultures and
historic times suggest that music is not a purely audi-
tory phenomenon. Even modern-day Western perform-
ers and listeners experience music in an integrated,
multimodal way (Thompson, Graham, & Russo, 2005).
Affective cues in music are integrated with those in
accompanying gestures and facial expressions, and par-
allels exist in the nature of such cues in different
domains such as melody and prosody. This overlap of
cues in music and prosody suggest that these domains
have a common ancestry (Brown, 2000).
More generally, parallels and convergences among
domains raise the possibility that some properties of
music are exaptations of an earlier system of affective
communication that integrated processes from several
domains within and beyond the auditory system.
Although exaptations are phenotypic changes with no
corresponding change in genotype (Justus & Hutsler,
p. 4), strategies exist for identifying and exploring
underlying behaviors and functions involved in exapta-
tion. Most essential is the identification of musical
properties that are observed across cultures and historic
periods. Such analyses allow us to delineate the scope
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of activities under discussion and prevent us from
inadvertently defining music from the perspective of
contemporary Western forms (Cross, 2003).
Looking beyond the surface features of Western music
toward abstract processes and properties that connect
the diversity of musical forms and behaviors, it is diffi-
cult to identify structural features or functions common
to all music. Once we reach a point of abstraction that
connects all musical phenomena, the resultant constructs
describe behaviors and functions that extend beyond
music to other domains such as speech, and to other
modalities. As we grasp at greater levels of abstraction,
there appears to be no clear point where all music is
captured, but nothing else.
One of the most salient properties of music is its asso-
ciation with affect (Juslin & Sloboda, 2001), although
not everyone agrees on the significance of the associa-
tion. Cross (2003) has questioned conceptions of music
that connect it necessarily with affect, arguing that its
uses are not restricted to the communication or induc-
tion of emotion. However, while music is not always
ostensibly about emotion, we believe it is inherently
connected with affect and it is this connection that
allows music to function flexibly over a wide range of
contexts. Without affect as a mediating factor, the var-
iegated uses of music would have to be explained by
semantic links as in language, or iconic links as in pic-
tures. Both explanations seem doubtful. Cross (2005)
has reasoned that music has semanticity that is merely
“non-consensual,” but such a conception understates
the stark difference between music and language in
their capacity to represent ideas. Even music that per-
forms a generic function such as The Wedding March
from Wagner’s opera Lohengrin is experienced in fun-
damentally different ways than verbal messages about
marriage. Music is used in a variety of contexts not
because it represents ideas directly, but because
its capacity to express or induce nuanced affective
states allows it to function flexibly across diverse con-
texts (e.g., funerals and religious ceremonies, sporting
events, courting rituals).
If affect is pivotal to the various uses of music, then
one might expect to observe a correlation between
musicality and emotional intelligence. Emotional intel-
ligence has been described as a set of abilities for per-
ceiving, using, understanding, and managing emotions
(Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Salovey & Grewal, 2005).
Perceiving emotions, the most basic component of emo-
tional intelligence, relates to the detection and decoding
of emotion in faces, voices, and cultural artifacts. Using
emotions involves the ability to utilize emotions to
assist in general cognitive tasks and problem solving.
Understanding emotions is the ability to conceptualize
emotions and understand differences or connections
between them (e.g., between sadness and grief).
Managing emotions refers to the regulation of emotions
in self and others.
Resnicow, Salovey, and Repp (2004) administered an
emotional intelligence test to twenty-four listeners, who
also identified the intended emotions of piano perform-
ances. The researchers observed a significant correlation
between emotional intelligence and identification of
intended emotions (r  0.54). In another study,
Thompson, Schellenberg and Husain (2004) examined
the effects of music lessons on the ability to decode
affective connotations of speech prosody. Six-year-old
children were assigned to music lessons, drama lessons,
or no lessons for one year, and assessed for their ability
to decode emotional connotations of vocal utterances.
Children assigned to the keyboard condition outper-
formed other children, suggesting that some forms of
music lessons lead to enhanced emotional sensitivity. In
the same study, musically trained and untrained adults
identified emotions conveyed in tone sequences that
mimicked utterance prosody. Trained adults (M  45%)
were better than untrained adults (M  29%) at discern-
ing the emotional connotations of the prosodic patterns.
An important step in examining the role of affect in
music is to identify acoustic and structural aspects of
music that are reliably associated with affective conno-
tations. Figure 1 illustrates a cumulative analysis of
structural (score-based) cues for musical emotion based
on studies reviewed by Schubert, 1999, Gabrielsson and
Lindstrom, 2001, and Gabrielsson and Juslin, 2003
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FIG. 1. Meta-analysis of affective cues in music. Cues near the periph-
ery of the circle are based on the results of the greatest number of
studies; cues near the center are based on the results of the fewest
number of studies. As examples, “energetic” music tends to have a
faster tempo (red, 20 studies) and “happy” music tends to be com-
posed in a major mode (orange, 19 studies).
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(adapted from Livingstone & Brown, 2005). Affect is
represented in two dimensions: activity (arousal) and
valence. The position of cues on each axis reflects the
number of studies showing the association, and cues are
represented in quadrants if the corresponding associa-
tion was observed in multiple independent studies.
Notable features of the meta-analysis include the obser-
vation that fast tempi are strongly related to activity
but are associated with both positive and negative valence
(Husain, Thompson, & Schellenberg, 2002; Thompson,
Schellenberg, & Husain, 2001). The immediacy of cues
as a means of affective communication is evident in
their reflective symmetry. For example, a positively
valanced work has a major mode and simple har-
monies, while a negatively valanced work has a minor
mode and complex harmonies.
Many affective cues have parallels in nonmusical and
nonauditory domains, suggesting a broad scope of inquiry
(Ilie & Thompson, 2006; Thompson & Balkwill, 2006).
Such parallels raise the possibility that music is a carrier of
abstract affective cues that are also instantiated in other
domains and behaviors, from tone of voice to a slow-paced
gait to a sequence of visual impressions. Affective interac-
tion is not specific to music, but is relevant to many expres-
sive forms, including visual arts, dance, and prosody.
Identifying and defining the scope of affective cues
remains a fundamental challenge that requires perceptual,
cross-cultural, and cross-modal studies.
Several studies have examined cross-modal common-
alities in the communication of affect. Krumhansl and
Schenck (1997) exposed groups of participants to differ-
ent dimensions of a choreographed work: dance only,
music only, dance and music. Judgments of emotion
were highly similar in the three conditions. In another
study, Thompson, Graham, and Russo (2005) observed
that judgments of the affective quality of music were
influenced by the facial expressions of performers, and
recent evidence suggests that auditory and visual cues to
affect are integrated preattentively and unconsciously
(Thompson & Russo, 2006).
Dissanayake (2000) and Cross (2003) have empha-
sized the multimodal nature of music. Cross stressed a
form of “floating intentionality” of musics, in which
“their ‘aboutness’ . . . might be ‘about’ different things at
different times” (Cross, 2003, p. 81). We concur with
the model proposed by Cross, but posit a central role
of affect in musical origins. We also agree with
Dissanayake’s model of “rhythmic-modality” and its
underlying affective motivation, but feel it is premature
to make the strong claim that musical origins are tied
specifically to genes selected for caregiver-infant inter-
actions. Not only is evidence unsettled for musicality
in mammals that demonstrate strong mothering instincts,
but many complex mothering behaviors may be driven
by experientially based mechanisms (Fleming, O’Day,
& Kraemer, 1999). We propose that a general capacity
for affective interaction, coupled with the emergence of
a theory of mind, enabled a host of symbolic systems,
including music. Musical aspects of caregiver-infant
interaction are one outcome of these functions, and
provide infants with early exposure to music-like
structures.
The appearance of Homo sapiens 150,000 to 100,000
years ago marked a significant shift in human evolu-
tion, heralding an explosion in cultural phenomena.
These developments coincided with the maturation of
a complete “Theory of Mind” (ToM) (Baron-Cohen,
1999; Burns, 2004). A ToM refers to the cognitive
capacity to “[understand] people as mental beings who
have beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions and
whose actions and interactions can be interpreted and
explained by taking account of these mental states”
(Astington & Baird 2005, p. 3). This capacity provides a
means of hypothesis testing for the behaviors of
others. Its development is closely interrelated with
linguistic capacity (Astington & Jenkins, 1999) and
parent-child social interaction in joint-attention activities
(Tomasello, 2003).
One of the significant consequences of a ToM is the
ability to construct and employ symbols: abstractions or
meta-representations (Suddendorf, 1999) of objects,
people, social constructs, and their interrelations. This
use of symbolism allowed for the development of sym-
bolic language whereby representational elements could
be grouped into larger, hierarchical structures. The
capacity for symbolic thought led to the diverse range of
systems that covers all cultural modalities: visual art,
language, dance, religion, and music. While a ToM is
often discussed as a model of complex social exchange
(Mithen, 1996) and shared intentionality (Tomasello et
al., 2005), it also provides a mechanism for reflective dis-
course. Through this capacity an individual can con-
struct a statement or thought, and then make an
evaluative statement regarding it (Lohmann et al., 2005).
Mithen (1996) refers to this capacity as “reflexive con-
sciousness.” Great apes exhibit a precursory form of a
ToM but lack the cognitive skill required for the
exchange of psychological states, including emotions,
experiences, and activities.
Music and related arts may be construed as systems of
affective interaction and reflexive thinking. In this
context, a ToM is a derivative of the Aristotelian posi-
tion in which our experience with artworks is a form
of affective sandboxing; a means of pursuing affective
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exploration / hypothesis testing in a safe environment
(Davies, 2001). This contemplative process enables the
refinement and progression of individual works and
compositional styles, allowing the creator to assess and
modify the affective quality of their creation. These
processes affirm who and what we are (e.g., a heavy-
metal enthusiast, a political activist, a Hindu) through
affiliate communication and expressions of individual-
ity. In infancy we lay the foundations of music with the
learning of affective cues; but our ability to create music
emerges from our capacity to engage with symbolic
hierarchical systems, our desire for affective social com-
munication, and a reflexive motivation to explore our
identity.
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